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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
perform in an exhibition for profit, under a contract by which the musician
has authority to play whatever compositions are in accordance with her
judgment appropriate and fitting, must be held responsible for all that is
done by the musician. By giving her that authority the employer acquiesces
in and ratifies whatever she does. If under his contract he has parted with
the right to exercise this control over her actions, without making inquiry
as to what she intends to play, he yet must be deemed to have taken part,
and to have given her general authority to perform copyright compositions."
Ha7-/ns et al. v. Cohen (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1922) 279 F. 276. See also M. Wit-
mark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co. (D. C. E. D. S. C. 1924) 298 F. 470.
When scrutinized closely it is apparent that the above passage, in effect,
says that when the employer parts with the right to control the actions of
the independent contractor he is deemed to have given general authority for
the commission of torts, thus disregarding all of the immunities which have
come to be considered incidents of the employer-independent contractor re-
lationship. For copyright infringement purposes, then, there is no distinc-
tion between the master-servant and employer-independent contractor re-
lationship.
The result reached in the main case is not inequitable, but rather desir-
able. In view of the general practice in agency cases we might rather expect
the decision to be on the ground that the orchestra leader was not truly an
independent contractor than on the ground that defendant profited from the
music, however much more realistic the latter ground may be. In many
cases involving small jobs it is found more expedient and equitable to con-
sider what are technically independent contractors as servants, and thus to
render employers liable for their torts. In some cases where this is not
done a very inequitable result is reached. In an Arkansas case defendant
physicians owned and operated a hospital. They had an X-ray department
but defendants, knowing nothing of X-rays placed an expert in charge.
Through the negligence and incompetence of an employee of the department
plaintiff was burned severely. Defendants were held not liable because the
wrongdoer was an independent contractor (on the general theory that phy-
sicians occupy this position). Runyan v. Goodrum (1921) 147 Ark. 481, 228
S. W. 397. Obviously this is an extreme case but it raises the question as to
the desirability, in all cases, of exempting the employer from liability for
the torts of his independent contractor.
There is no logical ground for distinction between the copyright cases and
those of other business situations in which the independent contractor is in-
volved. We are not ready to discard the law of independent contractor as it
has grown up; yet these cases are suggestive of a possible survey of the
whole field with a view to effecting changes of policy in those situations in
which the results reached under the general rule are unsatisfactory.
B. L. W., '31.
CHARiTIEs-LLABILITY IN TORT-EFFEOT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE.-Plain-
tiff was injured as the result of a fall upon ice on the sidewalk of a build-
ing owned by defendant, a charitable corporation. Evidence that defend-
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ant held a policy of insurance covering such accidents was excluded, and a
verdict directed for defendant. Held, the carrying of insurance did not
deprive defendant of the exemption from tort liability enjoyed by charitable
corporations. Eleanor Enman v. Trustees of Boston University (1930)
170 N. E. 43.
Charitable organizations are exempt from liability for some classes of
torts in almost all jurisdictions. 5 R. C. L. 374-379; 11 C. J. 374-378.
Three reasons for this immunity have been advanced: first, that it is a
matter of public policy that charity funds should not go to tort claims;
second, that the funds are impressed with a trust for charitable purposes,
from which they cannot be diverted; and third, that persons entering
charitable institutions waive their recourse for torts committed. Williams'
Adm'x v. Church Home for Females and Infirmary for Sick (1928) 223 Ky.
355, 3 S. W. (2d) 753. The third reason applies only to cases of inmates
of institutions, but the first and second cover the whole subject, and may
be applied to the principal case. The fundamental consideration is public
policy.
The question is whether the public policy which is held to exempt chari-
table corporations from tort liability applies to a case where the corporation
carries liability insurance. Where insurance is carried to indemnify its
losses, allowing recovery will not deplete its funds. The reason for the
rule having failed, it would seem that the rule is not applicable to the situa-
tion. But the other two cases which have directly decided the point have
agreed with the principal case. Levy v. Superior Court (1925) 74 Cal.
App. 171, 239 Pac. 1100; Williams' Adm'x v. Church Home for Females and
Infirmary for Sick, above. Their argument is as follows: a charitable
corporation is exempt from liability for torts. This institution has con-
tracted with an insurance company that the latter should compensate it
for any losses it sustains because of certain torts. But this contract can-
not make it liable for torts for which it was not liable before. From this
it follows that since the insurance company has assumed no risk of loss, the
contract is of no effect. The fallacy of this position is obvious. Using
a general rule as the starting point of reasoning, it decides that there can
be no exception to the rule. But if the basis of the rule-the policy that
charitable funds should not be depleted-is considered, it is clear that an
exception to the rule of exemption from liability should exist in cases where
insurance is carried.
The results of the application of the general rule of exemption from lia-
bility have been so varied and there are so many glosses and exceptions in
many jurisdictions that it is apparent that courts are doubting the policy
which has been so often stated. New Hampshire has held liability in all
cases. Hewett v. Woman's Hospital Aid Ass'n (1906) 73 N. H. 556, 64 Atl.
190. When most charitable institutions were both small and poor, there
may have been good reason to exempt them from tort liability; but with
large institutions, adequately supplied with funds and run just as businesses
are run, a modern public policy would require that individuals be protected
from the negligence of charities rather than charities from the relatively
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infrequent suits of individuals. The rule of exemption was not adopted
with such institutions in mind. Neither was it contemplated that insurance
could be successfully used to preserve charitable funds from damage claims.
As times passes, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify the application
of the rule to any circumstances, and no justification whatever exists in
cases where insurance is carried. J. A. G., '31.
CONSTiTUTIONAL LAw-CouRTs-PowER OVER ADMISSIONS TO BAn.-An
applicant to the bar had passed the educational test, but the board of bar
examiners refused to grant him a certificate of good moral character. On
application, the Supreme Court admitted him to practice despite the failure
to obtain the required certificate, on the ground that it believed his character
to be good. Brydonjacc v. State Bar of California (Cal. 1929) 281 Pac.
1018. The court declared that its decision was not necessarily contrary to
the statute creating the board, but the real issue was as to the legislature's
power to regulate the bar.
Since attorneys are officers of the court, the power to admit applicants to
practice is judicial and not legislative. But decisions generally concede that
the legislature may, in the exercise of its police power, prescribe reasonable
rules and regulations for admission to the bar. 6 C. J. 571, 2. With this as
a basis, it has usually been held that compliance with statutory requirements
does not make the practice of law a matter of right and that courts may im-
pose additional requirements upon applicants. Olmsted's Case (1928) 292
Pa. 98, 140 Atl. 634; In Te Peters (1927) 221 App. Div. 607, 225 N. Y. S.
144, aff'd 250 N. Y. 595, 166 N. E. 337; In Te Platz (1913) 42 Utah 439, 132
Pac. 390. The only case which directly opposes this doctrine is In re Appli-
cants for License to Practice Law (1906) 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635, in which
two judges dissented.
The question raised by the principal case, however, is not whether courts
may impose additional requirements, but whether they may admit attorneys
to practice in spite of their failure to comply -with existing statutory re-
quirements. The only other case in which the question has been directly
raised is In Te Bowers (1918) 138 Tenn. 662, 200 S. W. 821, in which the
court stated: "The question for determination now is whether upon excep-
tions to the board's report, this court will go into evidence and determine for
itself contrary to the recommendations of the board that the applicant
should be admitted to practice. It seems to us that the mere statement of
the proposition is its own answer. . . The certificate of the board is the
only thing which the Legislature intended that we should consider, and when
the board refuses to make a certificate, or, as in this case, certifies that the
applicant is an unfit person to be admitted to the practice, that ends the
matter in the absence of allegation and proof of fraud, corruption, or op-
pression on the part of the board."
The police-power theory of the legislature's control over bar admissions
is that the legal profession can be regulated just as other professions and
businesses. But the legislature, under the police power, can regulate no
business, profession, or occupation unless a reasonable necessity exists. 6
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